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Abstract—The problem of dynamic pricing of electricity in a
retail market is considered. A Stackelberg game is used to model
interactions between a retailer and its customers; the retailer sets
the day-ahead hourly price of electricity and consumers adjust
real-time consumptions to maximize individual consumer surplus.
For thermostatic demands, the optimal aggregated demand
is shown to be an affine function of the day-ahead hourly
price. A complete characterization of the trade-offs between
consumer surplus and retail profit is obtained. The Pareto front
of achievable trade-offs is shown to be concave, and each point
on the Pareto front is achieved by an optimal day-ahead hourly
price.
Effects of integrating renewables and local storage are ana-
lyzed. It is shown that benefits of renewable integration all go to
the retailer when the capacity of renewable is relatively small.
As the capacity increases beyond a certain threshold, the benefit
from renewable that goes to consumers increases.
Index Terms—demand response; dynamic pricing; thermo-
static control; renewable integration; home energy storage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Demand response in a smart grid is expected to offer
economic benefits to consumers while improving overall op-
eration efficiency and reliability. A properly designed demand
response program can reduce the peak load, compensate for
uncertainties associated intermittent renewables, and reduce
the cost of system operation.
Two types of demand response are commonly used. One
gives the retail utility direct control of consumers’ consump-
tions. See, e.g., [1], [2], [3]. Although this form of demand
response provides flexibilities to the system operator, a con-
sumer loses the ability to manage consumption based on her
own preferences.
An alternative is to reshape demand response through dy-
namic pricing. Examples of this type of programs include
the use of critical pricing [4] and real time pricing [5], [6].
Such schemes allow the consumers to mange consumptions
individually.
In this paper, we consider a demand response scheme of
the second type. We focus on a particular type of dynamic
pricing referred to as the day-ahead hourly pricing (DAHP).
DAHP was first considered in [5], [6] and has already been
implemented by some utility companies in U.S. [7]. Under
DAHP, the hourly retail prices of electricity are set one day
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Fig. 1: CS-RP trade-off curve with different dynamic
pricing schemes.
ahead of the actual consumptions, thus providing a level of
price certainty to consumers. DAHP also allows the retailer
to adjust prices on a day-to-day basis, taking into account
operating conditions at the wholesale market. The empirical
study of DAHP reported in [7] concludes that DAHP “not only
improves the linkage between wholesale and retail markets,
but also promotes the development of retail competition.”
A. Summary of Main Results
We analyze in this paper interactions between a retailer and
its customers. We use the term retailer to include the traditional
retail utilities as well as energy aggregators in a smart grid
setting. A Stackelberg game model is used to capture retailer-
consumer interactions in which the retailer is the leader who
sets the DAHP and the consumers the followers who adjust
individual consumption. For thermostatically controlled load,
we show in Section II-B that the optimal aggregated demand
is an affine function of the DAHP, and the optimal DAHP can
be obtained via convex optimizations.
Main results of this paper are built upon the characterization
of the Pareto front of trade-offs between consumer surplus
(CS) and retail profit (RP), as illustrated in Fig. 1, where
each point on the Pareto front is associated with an optimized
DAHP. We show in Section II that the Pareto front is concave
and monotonically decreasing. Several well known pricing
schemes are shown in Fig. 1. In particular, in the absence
of renewable integration and energy storage, the price pisw
that maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and retail profit
(the social welfare) is shown to result in zero retail profit.
This means that the social welfare maximization price is not
economically viable to the retailer. The optimal regulated
monopoly price pir is associated with the point on the Pareto
front where the retailer’s profit is fixed at some ∆. The retail
profit maximization price is pio when no constraint is imposed
2on the retailer. We note also that benchmark pricing schemes
such as constant pricing, time of use (ToU) and proportional
markup pricing are suboptimal; they are in general inside the
Pareto front, indicating that improvement can be achieved by
applying the optimization framework developed in Section III.
We also consider effects of incorporating renewable en-
ergy and energy storage. We show that, when the retailer
integrates renewable sources, the retail profit at the social
welfare optimizing DAHP is positive, making social welfare
maximization potentially a viable operation objective. It is
shown that the benefit of renewable integration all goes to the
retailer when the capacity of renewable integration is small.
As the capacity increases, so does the benefit to consumers.
For the consumer side storage, we show that the CS-RP
trade-off can be formulated under the same Stackelberg game
framework.
Simulation studies are presented using realistic electricity
prices and home energy management models to illustrate the
benefits of distributed energy management and DAHP-based
demand response. The effects of renewable generation on the
trade-off curve between consumer surplus and retail profits are
illustrated via simulations.
B. Related work
The literature on dynamic pricing at retail level appeared
along with the beginning of wholesale market deregulation.
In [5], [8], the authors demonstrated the benefit of DAHP
and showed that DAHP could attract consumers in the long
run. In [9], [10], retail price optimization was formulated by
considering consumer side uncertainties and financial risks.
Relative to this line of existing work, the main contribution of
this paper is a full characterization of the trade-off between
the achievable retail profit and consumer surplus.
The use of Stackelberg game model to study interactions
between a retailer and its consumers goes back to [11]. The
authors of [11] presented a general game theoretic framework
and a load adaptive pricing scheme. The pricing scheme
considered in [11] is different from the DAHP treated here,
primarily because the load adaptive pricing was designed for
a vertically integrated utility whereas the DAHP considered
in this paper is applicable for a deregulated market operating
based on a two-settlement mechanism. Instead of aiming at
the single objective of global social optimality as in [11], we
give a full characterization of optimal solutions for a set of
(local) objectives.
Extensive results exist on optimizing demand response op-
erations. For example, a distributed algorithm was developed
to achieve social welfare maximization in [12]. A hierarchical
market structure and distributed optimization is also consid-
ered in [13]. Contract design between renewable generators
and the aggregator is studied in [14], where the aggregator is
responsible for a large scale PHEV charging. A particularly
relevant work, from a modeling perspective, is the generalized
battery model [15] that captures succinctly the thermostatic
control as a generalized battery model. The demand model
used in this paper falls in this category.
C. Organization and notations
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, a Stacel-
berg game is introduced and rational behaviors of the retailer
and its customers are analyzed. Section III characterizes the
tradeoff between the retail profit and consumer surplus. In
Section IV, renewable integrations by the retail utility is
considered. Section V considers the problem when storage
devices are used at the consumer side. In Section VI, we con-
duct numerical simulations to compare different benchmark
schemes and investigate the effects of renewable integration.
Throughout the paper, (x1, · · · , xN ) is for a column vector
and [x1, · · · , xM ] a row vector. We use x+ to represent
max{0, x}, x− to represent max{0,−x}, and x¯ the expected
value E[x].
II. A STACKELBERG GAME MODEL
A. DAHP and a Stackelberg game model
We model the retailer-consumer interactions through DAHP
using a Stackelberg game where the retailer is the leader by
setting the DAHP and consumers the follower by adjusting
their individual consumption.
1) The DAHP pi = (pi1, · · · , pi24) is a 24-dimensional real
vector where pii is the retail price of electricity at hour
i. The DAHP is set one day ahead and fixed throughout
the day of operation. The pay-off function of the retailer
will be defined later in Section II-C.
2) In real time, a consumer dynamically determines her
consumption. If storage is available, the consumer may
also charge or discharge the storage. Selling back surplus
power in a net metering setting is allowed. The payment
from a consumer to the retailer is settled as the inner
product of pi and the real-time energy consumption. The
pay-off function of consumers is the consumer surplus
that measures the satisfaction of the consumer. One
candidate is provided in Section II-B.
3) The retailer meets the aggregated demand by purchasing
electricity at the wholesale market, possibly comple-
menting the purchase by its own renewables.
The Stackelberg game can be solved via a backward induc-
tion. We thus present first the analysis of consumers’ response
to a fixed DAHP pi. The problem of optimizing pi from the
retailer’s point of view is then considered.
B. Consumer action: optimal demand response
We start our analysis of the Stackelberg game from the
consumer side. After the DAHP pi is given, a consumer
dynamically determines her own consumption to optimize the
consumer surplus defined by the difference between the utility
of consumption and the electricity payment. It is assumed that
the consumer in a smart grid can adjust her consumption based
on real-time measurements. The optimal control policy and the
resulted demand response serve as the predicted behavior of
a rational consumer in the Stackelberg game described above.
In this paper, we consider price elastic demands that are
results of optimal control of a linear system. A typical example
3is the thermostatically controlled loads. See [15] for a general
model for other types of applications.
For thermostatic control involving heating-ventilation and
air conditioning (HVAC) units, empirical study [16] shows that
the dynamic equation that governs the temperature evolution
is given by
xi = xi−1 + α(ai − xi−1)− βpi + wi,
yi = (xi, ai) + vi,
(1)
where i is the index of period, yi the noisy measurements of
the indoor temperature xi and outdoor temperature ai, pi the
power drawn by the HVAC unit, wi the process noise and vi
the measurement noise. Both wi and vi are assumed to be
zero mean and Gaussian. System parameters α (0 < α < 1)
and β model the insolation of the building and efficiency of
the HVAC unit. Note that the above equation applies to both
heating and cooling scenarios. But we exclude the scenario
that the HVAC does both heating and cooling during the same
day. We focus herein on the cooling scenario (β > 0) and the
results apply to heating (β < 0) as well.
In the following, we will use superscript (j) to denote the
variables associated with consumer j. For consumer j, assume
that she wants to keep the indoor temperature close to her own
desired temperature t(j)i for the ith hour. The deviation of the
actual indoor temperature x(j)i from the desired temperature
t
(j)
i can be used to measure consumer j’s discomfort level.
By assuming symmetric upward and downward discomfort
measure, a quadratic form of consumer utility over N periods
is given by
u(j) = −µ(j)
N∑
i=1
(x
(j)
i − t
(j)
i )
2, (2)
where µ(j) is consumer j’s weight factor to convert the
temperature deviation to a monetary value.
The consumer surplus of consumer j is defined by the differ-
ence between the consumer utility and the total payment from
the consumers. In particular, given a DAHP pi = (pi1, · · · , pi24)
and energy consumption p(j)i in the ith hour, the payment
for the real-time consumption from consumer j is settled as∑24
i=1 piip
(j)
i . Therefore, her consumer surplus is a random
variable given by
cs(j)
∆
=u(j) − piTp(j), (3)
where p(j) = (p(j)1 , · · · , p
(j)
24 ).
We use the consumer surplus as the payoff function of con-
sumers in the Stackelberg game, and the action of a consumer
is to decide the electricity consumption during each period.
As an assumption, a rational consumer maximizes consumer
surplus in real time according to DAHP and her current energy
state x(j)i . Therefore, the solution to the following stochastic
control program characterizes the demand response to DAHP.
maxp(j) E
{∑24
i=1[−µ
(j)(x
(j)
i − t
(j)
i )
2]− piTp(j)
}
s.t. x(j)i = x
(j)
i−1 + α
(j)(ai − x
(j)
i−1)− β
(j)p
(j)
i + w
(j)
i ,
y
(j)
i = (x
(j)
i , ai) + v
(j)
i . (4)
Under mild conditions where the price doesn’t vary too
much during a day and µ(j) is large, we ignore the positivity
constraint and the rate constraint for energy consumption p(j).
The backward induction gives the optimal demand response
as shown in the following theorem first appeared in [17].
Theorem 1: Under DAHP, the optimal aggregated residential
demand response for a fixed DAHP pi has the following form,
d(pi) = −Gpi + b, (5)
where d(pi) is a random vector whose ith entry is the aggre-
gated demand from all consumers in hour i, G a deterministic
and positive definite matrix, depending only on system param-
eters and user preferences, and b a Gaussian random vector
corresponding to the overall process and observation noise.
Proof: see the Appendix. 
Theorem (1) establishes an affine relationship between the
optimal demand response and day-ahead hour price under
some mild conditions. It is shown that the sensitivity matrix
of demand with respect to price, −G, is not affected by the
realization of randomness. This means that the change of price
will have deterministic effect on the expected value of demand.
Also, we see that the retailer does not need to estimate each
consumer’s parameters in Eq. (4), including µ, α, β and etc..
It only needs to fit the affine model as in Eq. (5) based on
historical data. Herein, we assume that rational consumers
follow the optimal demand response according to Eq. (5).
Given the retail price pi, by substituting the optimal demand
response in Theorem 1 back into the consumer optimization
problem, the expected total consumer surplus (summed over
all consumers) is given by
cs(pi) =
∑
j
cs(j)(pi),
=
∑
j
E
(
[−
24∑
i=1
µ(x
∗(j)
i − ti)
2]− piTp∗(j)(pi),
)
= piTGpi/2− piTb¯+ c, (6)
where we used the fact that E(p∗(j)(pi)) = −G(j)pi + b¯(j) for
the jth consumer and G∆=
∑
j G
(j)
, b¯
∆
=
∑
j b¯
(j)
. Here x∗(j)
and p∗(j)(pi) are the same as the values in the proof of
Theorem 1 in the Appendix, and c is a constant depending
on the variance of the noise.
C. Retailer’s action: optimal dynamic pricing
In this paper, we assume that the retailer is a price taker
in the wholesale real time market. This means that the
aggregated demand from consumers in real time does not
affect the wholesale price. Additionally, we assume that the
Stackelberg game discussed in this paper is one with perfect
information, which means the leader has complete knowledge
of the follower’s payoff function. In the real-time operation,
the retailer is required to satisfy aggregated demand by paying
for the distribution cost and the cost of procuring power from
the wholesale market.
Let λ = (λ1, λ2, ..., λ24) denote the random vector of
average marginal cost during each hour, which includes the
4wholesale electricity price, distribution cost and other service
cost. The total expected daily retail profit rp(pi), defined as
the difference between the expected real time retail revenue
and the retail cost, is given by
rp(pi) = E ((pi − λ)Td(pi), )
= (pi − λ¯)T(−Gpi + b¯), (7)
where we use the assumption that, given fixed DADP pi,
the real-time wholesale price is independent of the real-time
consumption.
The retailer’s pricing decision depends on its own payoff
function. A particularly relevant objective is the social welfare
defined as the sum of consumer surplus and retail profit, i .e.,
sw(pi) = rp(pi) + cs(pi). (8)
Using (6-7), we obtain the following theorem that character-
izes the social welfare maximizing DAHP.
Theorem 2: The optimal retail price pisw that maximizes the
expected social welfare is the expected real time retail cost,
pisw = λ¯,
and the expected retail profit under pisw is rp(pisw) = 0. And
for any pi′ such that rp(pi′) ≥ 0, cs(pi′) ≤ cs(pisw).
Proof: See the Appendix. 
Theorem 2 shows that, if the social welfare is to be
maximized, the retailer generates no profit. It is also shown
that when social welfare is the payoff function, the retailer
simply matches the DAHP with the expected retail cost.
III. PARETO FRONT OF TRADEOFFS
In this section, we solve the Stackelberg game with a
weighted social welfare as the retailer’s payoff function. Our
goal is to characterize the Pareto front of the CS vs. RP
tradeoffs. In particular, we consider the following optimization
for the retailer
max {rp(pi) + ηcs(pi)}, (9)
where η is a parameter that allows the retailer to weigh its
profit against consumer’s satisfaction.
In practice, η can be set according to the operating cost, long
term business plan, and social impact etc. The two extremes
are the social welfare optimization when η = 1 and profit
maximization when η = 0. For a profit regulated monopoly,
the retailer sets η to maintain the allowed level of profit. In
this case, the retailer may want to maximize consumer surplus
subject to obtaining its regulated profit in order to maintain or
attract additional customers.
For the defined Stackelberg game, the action of the retailer is
to determine the day-ahead hourly price to maximize the pay-
off function. Given the expected cost λ¯ of procuring electricity
from the wholesale market, and the preference parameter η,
we can solve Eq. (9) by substituting (6-7) in (9), yielding
rp(pi) + ηcs(pi) = (η
2
− 1)piTGpi
+piT((1 − η)b¯+Gλ¯) + ηc,
from which we obtain the optimal price as
pi∗(λ¯, η) =
1
2− η
λ¯+
1− η
2− η
G−1b¯. (10)
Note that the optimized DADP in (10) is made of two terms.
The first depends only on the expected wholesale price of
electricity, which represents the cost to the retail. As an
economic signal to consumers, this term corresponds to the
behavior that the retail price follows the average wholesale
price of electricity. The second term depends only on the con-
sumer preference and randomness associated with consumer
environments.
With (10), the Pareto front of CS-RP tradeoffs is character-
ized by
Pλ¯ =
{(
cs(pi∗(λ¯, η)), rp(pi∗(λ¯, η))
)
: η ∈ [0, 1]
}
, (11)
where each element of Pλ¯ can be computed in closed form.
The shape of the trade-off region is characterized by the
following theorem.
Theorem 3: The Pareto front of (cs, rp) is concave and
decreasing. The area above the Pareto front is infeasible for
the retailer to achieve under DAHP whereas the closed area
on and below the Pareto front can be achieved by DAHP.
Proof: See the Appendix. 
We can now revisit Fig. 1 in lights of the analysis developed
in this section. As summarized in Sec I.A, the achievable
tradeoff region is convex in the CS-RP plane. The Pareto front
Pλ¯ is a collection of CS-RP tradeoffs achieved by optimal
DADP. The social welfare maximizing pricing pisw results
in zero retail profit, and profit regulated monopoly price pir
is located at the Pareto front where the retail profit has a
regulated profit ∆. Prices such as constant prices, ToU, and
markups on day-ahead wholesale price are typically inside the
Pareto front Pλ¯, thus suboptimal in general. See validations
from numerical simulations in Sec VI.
An alternative formulation is based on a practical situation
where the retailer optimizes its profit under the constraint that
the consumer surplus exceeds a certain level. In particular, the
problem is formulated as
max
pi
rp(pi) subject to cs(pi) ≥ τ. (12)
The following theorem shows the equivalence between (12)
and (9) in obtaining the Pareto front in (11).
Theorem 4: For any specific η, if the solution in (9) is pi∗,
pi∗ is also a solution to (12) with τ = cs(pi∗). Varying τ in
optimization (12) and varying η in optimization (9) results in
the same Pareto front Pλ¯ in (11).
Proof: See the Appendix. 
IV. EFFECTS OF RENEWABLE INTEGRATION
We consider in this section the role of renewable energy
at the retailer side. As a large load aggregator, the retailer
may have the financial ability and incentive to have its own or
contracted solar/wind farms. We restrict ourself to the scenario
that the retailer owned renewables are used to compensate the
real time loads; the extra renewable power is spilled.
5Denote the vector of hourly marginal cost of renweable as
ν. It is reasonable to assume λ − ν > 0 to hold every where
in practice. Let q = (q1, ..., q24) be the maximum renewable
power accessible to the retailer in each hour. Accordingly, the
retailer’s profit with renewable integration is changed to
rpRenew(pi) = piTd(pi)−min0≤q˜≤q{(λ− ν)T(d(pi) − q˜)+
+νTq˜},
= piTd(pi)− νTd(pi)− (λ − ν)T(d(pi) − q)+,
(13)
where q˜ is the actual renewable power the retailer used, and the
function (x)+ is the positive part of x, defined as max{x, 0}.
Notice that the expected retail profit is also a concave
function of the DAHP vector, pi. Therefore, if the retailer’s
objective is profit maximization, the optimal price can be
easily solved by a convex program.
Following similar discussions in Section III, we focus on the
problem that the retailer’s payoff function is weighted social
welfare. Notice here that the consumer surplus does not change
while the retail profit rp(pi) is replaced by rpRenew(pi). Solving
the following optimization problem will give the Pareto front
for the RP vs. CS trade-offs in the presence of renewable
integration.
max {rpRenew(pi) + ηcs(pi)}. (14)
Intuitively the achievable trade-off region between CS and
RP will be enlarged due to renewables toward upright in the
CS-RP plane. The following theorem verifies this intuition
and further shows how the benefit of renewable integration
is distributed between the retailer and its consumers.
Theorem 5: Assume that for each hour i, the renewable
power is uniformly distributed with maximum capacity K ,
i .e., qi ∼ U [0,K]. For each preference parameter η, let the
optimal price in (14) be piηRenew and the corresponding expected
demand d¯(η). Define ∆rp(η) and ∆cs(η) as the increases of
retail profit and consumer surplus due to renewable integration,
respectively. We then have the following statements:
1) Renewable integration always increases retail profit,
i .e., rpw(piηw) > 0 for all η.
2) When K ≤ mini∈{1,...,24} d¯i(η), ∆cs(η) = 0. Other-
wise, ∆cs(η) > 0.
3) As K →∞, the fraction of renewable integration benefit
to consumer surplus ∆cs(η)
∆cs(η)+∆rp(η) →
1
3−2η .
Proof: See the Appendix. 
Theorem 5 shows that the benefit of renewable all goes to
the retailer when the capacity is small. The intuition is that
the retailer would naturally use the low cost energy to fulfill
the need of demand and pocket the benefit. As the capacity
of renewable integration increases, the additional renewable
will be spilled unless the consumption increases. The only
way to increase the retail profit is to increase consumption
by lowering the price of electricity. As a result, all consumer
benefits from the price reduction. As K →∞, the fraction of
renewable integration benefit to CS converges to a particular
limit, 13−2η , depending only on the weighting factor η.
The above theorem also shows that when the retailer cares
only about its own profit, the fraction of renewable integration
to CS converges to 13 . On the other hand, if the retailer’s
objective is social welfare maximization, as the capacity of
renewable power goes to infinity, the fraction of renewable
integration benefit to consumer converges to 1 while the retail
profit converges to zero.
V. EFFECTS OF STORAGE AT THE CONSUMER SIDE
In this section, we consider the role of storage at the
consumer side. In particular, we assume the net-metering
option where a consumer can sell back the excess energy
with the same purchasing price. In the presence of storage,
a consumer can arbitrage over the hourly varying DAHP.
For hour i, denote the energy level in the battery as Bi
and the energy charged to the battery as ri (when ri ≤ 0,
it means discharging from the battery). Let ri = r+i − r−i
where r+i ≥ 0 and r
−
i ≥ 0 are the positive and negative parts
of ri, respectively. Then the dynamics of the battery can be
expressed as
Bi+1 = κ(Bi + τr
+
i − r
−
i /ρ), (15)
where κ ∈ (0, 1) is the storage efficiency, τ ∈ (0, 1) the
charging efficiency and ρ ∈ (0, 1) the discharging efficiency.
These efficiency factors model the potential energy loss during
the process of storage, charging and discharging.
After incorporating the storage devices, the optimal demand
response problem at the consumer side is changed to
p,r,B
max E
{∑24
i=1[−µ(xi − ti)
2]− piT(p+ r)
}
s.t. xi = xi−1 + α(ai − xi−1)− βpi + wi,
yi = (xi, ai) + vi,
Bi+1 = κ(Bi + τr
+
i − r
−
i /ρ),
B24 = B0, 0 ≤ Bi ≤ C,
0 ≤ r+i ≤ r
u, 0 ≤ r−i ≤ r
d,
(16)
where B0 is the initial energy level in the storage, C the
capacity of the battery, ru the charging limit, and rd the
discharging limit.
Under the net-metering assumption, the optimization prob-
lem can be divided into two independent sub problems, where
the first one is the same as the previous optimal stochastic
HVAC control (4) and the second one is purely energy
arbitrage[18]. This means that adding storage on the demand
side doesn’t change the original linear relationship between
the actual HVAC consumption and retail price; the benefit of
storage goes to the consumers only in the form of arbitrage
options.
Therefore, given day-ahead price pi, the optimal charging
vector r∗(pi) can be solved via the following deterministic
linear program:
r,B
max −piTr
subject to Bi+1 = κ(Bi + τr+i − r−i /ρ),
B24 = B0, 0 ≤ Bi ≤ C,
0 ≤ r+i ≤ r
u, 0 ≤ r−i ≤ r
d.
(17)
Using the original form of RP and CS without storage, rp(pi)
and cs(pi), the retailer’s payoff function in (9) changes to
max {rp(pi) + (pi − λ)Tr(pi) + η(cs(pi) − piTr(pi))}. (18)
6Solving (18) will give the induced tradeoff curve between CS
and RP under different weighting factor η.
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we present simulation results that help to
gain insights into effects of demand response with optimized
DAHP. The parameters used in the simulations were extracted
from actual temperature record in Hartford, CT, from July
1st, 2012 to July 30th, 2012. For the same period, we used
the record of day-ahead wholesale price for the same location
from ISO New England. The parameters for a HVAC thermal
dynamic model (1) were set at α = 0.5, β = 0.1, µ = 0.5.
The desired indoor temperature was set to be 18◦C for all
hours. We assumed zero marginal renewable power cost.
A. Benchmark comparisons
We first present direct comparisons between the optimized
DAHP with some simple benchmarks. Specifically, we con-
sidered the following well known schemes:
• Constant pricing (CP): in this case, the price remained
constant for the whole day, i .e., pi1 = pi2 = ... =
pi24 = x. Each value of pi had a corresponding CS and RP
pair. By varying x, we traced the performance of constant
pricing on the CS-RP plane.
• Time of Usage (ToU): in this case, a single day was
divided into two parts: peak hours and normal hours.
For a normal hour i, pii = pinorm, and for a peak hour
j, pij = pi
peak
, where pipeak > pinorm. In this section, we fixed
pipeak = 1.2pinorm and set the peak hours as 9am to 5pm.
• Proportional mark-up pricing (PMP): in this case, the
retail pricing was indexed by the day-ahead wholesale
price. Specifically, the ratio of DAHP at each hour over
the day-ahead wholesale price at the same hour was
constant, i .e., pi1
Eλ1
= pi2
Eλ2
= ... = pi24
Eλ24
= γ. By varying
γ, we traced the performance of this pricing on the CS-
RP plane.
Qualitatively, we expected that the CS-RP performance of
these schemes will fall inside the region defined by the Pareto
front.
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Fig. 2: Comparison of three pricing schemes
The trade-off curves under the four schemes were plotted
in Fig. 2. Theoretical statements established in the paper
Regulated RP DAHP PMP ToU CP
85 -152.0 -154.3 -170.2 -183.4
0 -60.3 -60.3 -60.9 -61.1
TABLE I: Comsumer surplus under different regulated
profits with four pricing schemes
DR Tolerance = 0 Tolerance = 2◦C
Payment 37.7 40.8 28.0
Discomfort Level 1.6 0 33.2
Consumer Surplus -39.3 -40.8 -61.2
TABLE II: Comparison of consumer payoff with and
without optimal demand response
were evident: the trade-off curves between CS and RP were
downward and concave. The social welfare optimal operating
point (η = 1) for the optimal DAHP resulted in zero retail
profit. For other pricing schemes, the points with zero profit
were quite close to the social welfare optimal operating point
under DAHP. Especially, since the social welfare maximization
price was equal to the proportional price with γ = 1, the social
welfare optimal operating point was also on the trade-off curve
under PMP. As expected, the traces of CP, PMP and traceToU
all fell under the optimal DAHP which defines the Pareto front.
Table I illustrates quantitatively the gain of the optimized
DAHP over typical benchmarks. The retail profits were fixed
and associated consumer surplus values were read from the
CS-RP tradeoff curves for all the pricing schemes. The per-
formance of PMP was close to DAHP since PMP also took
advantage of varying environment during a day, whereas TOU
and CP performed much worse due to the lack of flexibility;
DAHP achieved 10.7% gain over ToU and 17.1% gain over
CP when the regulated RP was fixed as 85.
We also compared the payoffs to consumers with and
without optimal demand response. Here we assumed a baseline
control policy aimed at maintaining the indoor temperature
below the desired temperature plus some tolerance. Table II
shows the results of optimal demand response and the sce-
narios with tolerances set to be 0 and 2 degrees, under the
social welfare maximization price. From the results we can
see that with the increase of tolerance, the payment to retailer
decreased but the uncomfort level grew fast. The optimal
demand response was the best if measured by the consumer
surplus as defined in Eq. (3).
B. Characteristics of DAHP
To gain insights into how the optimal DAHP balances the
tradeoff between RP and CS, we plotted the DAHP at each
hour for different values of η in Fig. 3. The two extreme
points were η = 0 for profit maximization and η = 1 for
social welfare optimization. In fact, the DAHP curve with
η = 1 was exactly the expected retail cost. We can see that,
the RP maximizing DAHP showed a temporal pattern that
matched the demand-supply dynamics. The prices were higher
at peak hours. What was not shown in this figure was that the
consumers used less energy in response to higher prices and
consumer surplus decreased. The CS-RP pair moved northwest
7along the Pareto front. In contrast, the social welfare optimal
price showed a more consistent pricing across all hours.
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Fig. 3: Comparison of consumer payoff with and
without optimal demand response
C. Renewable integration
Assuming renewable power in each hour was uniformly
distributed over [0,K], by solving the problem (14), we plotted
the trade-off curves between CS and RP in Fig. 4. Not
surprisingly, renewable integration enlarged the tradeoff curve
and all parties benefited from the low cost energy. In particular,
the social welfare optimal pricing became economically viable,
i .e., the social welfare maximization prices (rightmost points
on the trade-off curve) resulted in positive retail profit. Further-
more, when the capacity of renewable was small (K = 20),
the trade-off curve moved upward, indicating that almost all
the benefit from renewable integration went to the retailer.
When the capacity was larger (K = 50), the trade-off curve
went upright, which showed that some part of the renewable
integration benefit went to consumers.
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Fig. 4: Trade-off curve with renewable integration
Fig. 5 provided more insights into how the benefits of
renewable were distributed among the retailer and the con-
sumers. As the level of integration (K) increased, so did the
fraction of the renewable integration benefit to CS, ∆cs(η)∆rp(η) , and
it converged to 13−2η as K goes to infinity. More interestingly,
as η increased, more emphasis was placed on consumer
surplus, substantial gains were achieved by the consumers.
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Fig. 5: Fraction of renewable benefit to consumer
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied a day-ahead hourly pricing
(DAHP) mechanism for distributed demand response in uncer-
tain and dynamic environments. Such a pricing scheme has the
advantage of reducing consumer anxiety of pricing uncertain-
ties and allowing the retail utility to optimize the retail pricing
adaptively. The main contribution is a full characterization of
the tradeoff between consumer surplus and retail profit for a
class of demands. This result allows the retailer to optimize
its pricing strategy, taking into consideration his access to
renewable energy.
A number of important issues not treated in this paper
have been or are being addressed. For example, the system
parameters in the affine mapping of the aggregated load are
assumed to be known here. In practice, obtaining these param-
eters require machine learning techniques. See [19]. The model
considered here does not take into account the closed-loop
behavior in the sense that demand response in the distribution
system has an impact in the wholesale market. This is a
challenging topic deserves further study. The developed theory
can also be used to study the effects of demand side storage
and renewable integration. See [20].
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1
For simplicity, in this paper we consider the case that control
period length is 1 hour. For general cases where control period
length is different from 1 hour, similar proof can be followed
with some transformations. See [21] for details.
Through backward induction, the optimal control for con-
sumer j can be obtained as
p
∗(j)
i (pi) =
1
β
(
xˆ
(j)
i−1|i−1 + α
(j)(aˆi|i−1 − xˆ
(j)
i−1|i−1)− x
∗(j)
i
)
,
x
∗(j)
i
∆
= pii−(1−α
(j))pii+1
2µ(j)β(j)
+ t
(j)
i ,
where xˆ(j)
i−1|i−1 and aˆi|i−1 are the minimum mean squared
error estimate of indoor and outdoor temperatures of hour i
at hour i− 1, respectively. Here pi25 is assumed to be 0, and
x
∗(j)
i is an ancillary value. Expanding the solution above, the
total demand of consumer j is
p∗(j)(pi) = −G(j)pi + b(j),
where b(j) is Gaussian, independent of pi, and
G
(j)
ik =


[1 + (1− α(j))2]/[2µ(j)(β(j))2], if i = k 6= 1;
1/[2µ(j)(β(j))2], if i = k = 1;
(−1 + α(j))/[2µ(j)(β(j))2], if |i− k| = 1;
0, o.w.
Notice that for 0 < α < 1,
1/[2µ(j)(β(j))2] > |(−1 + α(j))/[2µ(j)(β(j))2]|,
[1+(1−α(j))2]/[2µ(j)(β(j))2] > 2|(−1+α(j))/[2µ(j)(β(j))2]|.
Therefore, G(j) is deterministic and diagonal dominant with
positive diagonal elements. Hence, G(j) is positive definite.
On the other hand, the optimal aggregated demand
d(pi) =
∑
k
p∗(j)(pi) = −Gpi + b,
where b =
∑
j b
(j)
, G =
∑
j G
(j)
. G is positive definite and
deterministic, depending only on the parameters.
Proof of Theorem 2
Setting the derivative of sw(pi) to zero gives the optimal
price and resulted retail profit as,pisw = λ¯, and rp(pisw) = 0.
For any pi′ such that rp(pi′) ≥ 0, we have
cs(pi′) = sw(pi′)− rp(pi′) ≤ sw(pisw)− 0 = cs(pisw).
Proof of Theorem 3
For η ∈ [0, 1], the solution to (9) is given by
pi∗ =
1
2− η
G−1[(1 − η)b¯+Gλ¯].
Define the resulted retail profit and consumer surplus as
rp∗(η)∆=rp(pi∗(η)), cs∗(η)∆=cs(pi∗(η)). Then,
∂rp∗(η)
∂cs∗(η)
=
∂rp∗(η)
∂η
∂cs∗(η)
∂η
= −η.
Because cs∗(η) is an increasing function of η, ∂rp
∗(η)
∂cs∗(η) de-
creases as cs∗(η) increases. The curve is concave. According
to Theorem 4, rp∗(η) is the optimal value of (12) when
consumer surplus is at least cs∗(η). Therefore, no CS-RP pair
can be above the trade-off curve.
Proof of Theorem 4
With a particular η, assume pi∗ is the solution to (9). Let
τ = cs(pi∗) in (12). Then pi∗ will be in the feasible set of (9).
If there exists pi′, such that rp(pi′) > rp(pi∗), and cs(pi′) ≥ τ ,
rp(pi′) + ηcs(pi′) > rp(pi∗) + ητ = rp(pi∗) + ηcs(pi∗).
Hence, pi∗ is not the solution to (9) since pi′ achieves better
objective value. It contradicts with the assumption. Therefore,
pi∗ is also a solution to (12).
Proof of Theorem 5
Before renewable integration, for any η, the first order
condition gives that the optimal demand level d(η) satisfies
b− (2− η)d(η) = Gλ.
After renewable integration, for a particular η, the first order
condition gives that the optimal demand level dw(η) satisfies
b−Gν − (2− η)dw(η) = G((λ − ν) ◦ F (dw(η))),
where ◦ means the Hadamard product, i .e., pointwise product
of two vectors, and F is the cdf of renewable power.
When K < mini di(η), we can see that d(η) satisfies the
optimal condition therefore dw(η) = d(η), ∆cs(η) = 0.
9Otherwise, dw(η) = d(η) + Gδ/(2 − η), where δ = (λ −
ν) ◦ (1− F (dw(η)) ≥ 0.
∆cs(η) = 12{(dw(η))
TG−1dw(η)− (d(η))
TG−1d(η)}
= 12{2δ
Td(η) + δTGδ} > 0.
For the RP, for all K and η,
∆rp(η) = (1 − η){(dw(η))TG−1dw(η)− (d(η))TG−1d(η)}
+ 12K {(dw(η))
TΛdw(η)} > 0,
where Λ = diag(λ¯1, ...λ¯24). As K goes to infinity, dw(η) is
bounded, ∆cs(η)
∆cs(η)+∆rp(η) goes to
1
3−2η .
Liyan Jia received his B.E. degree from De-
partment of Automation, Tsinghua University
in 2009. He is currently working toward the
Ph.D. degree in the School of Electrical and
Computer Engineering, Cornell University. His
current research interests are in smart grid,
electricity market and demand response.
Lang Tong (S’87,M’91,SM’01,F’05) is the Ir-
win and Joan Jacobs Professor in Engineering
of Cornell University and the site director of
Power Systems Engineering Research Center
(PSERC). He received the B.E. degree from
Tsinghua University in 1985, and M.S. and
Ph.D. degrees in electrical engineering in 1987
and 1991, respectively, from the University
of Notre Dame. He was a Postdoctoral Re-
search Affiliate at the Information Systems
Laboratory, Stanford University in 1991. He
was the 2001 Cor Wit Visiting Professor at the Delft University of
Technology and had held visiting positions at Stanford University
and the University of California at Berkeley.
Lang Tong’s research is in the general area of statistical inference,
communications, and complex networks. His current research focuses
on inference, optimization, and economic problems in energy and
power systems. He received the 1993 Outstanding Young Author
Award from the IEEE Circuits and Systems Society, the 2004 best
paper award from IEEE Signal Processing Society, and the 2004
Leonard G. Abraham Prize Paper Award from the IEEE Commu-
nications Society. He is also a coauthor of seven student paper
awards. He received Young Investigator Award from the Office of
Naval Research. He was a Distinguished Lecturer of the IEEE Signal
Processing Society.
